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a b s t r a c t
Social inclusion is a leading goal of policy and practice in care
and support for persons with intellectual disabilities. However, its
conceptualization, moral presuppositions and effects are far from
clear. In answering the call for reconceptualization, the author
refers to cultural-historical, sociological and philosophical analyses
on otherness and the other and on their integration in thought, in
discourse and in society. An alternative view of inclusion is offered
in which the attention is not directed at political, legal, or manage-
rial measures, but at connecting people by opening a dialogue in
which life stories are exchanged. In the second part of this contri-
bution, some theoretical foundations of such a narrative approach
of social inclusion are developed. Also, preconditions are explored
for a space in which a dialogue of life stories may ﬂourish. The role
of persons with intellectual disabilities as actors in and authors
of life stories is explained. It is concluded that all care paradigms,
including the current citizenship paradigm, suffer from a hege-
monic dichotomy that frustrates social inclusion. A paradigm of
encounter is proposed to underpin policies and practices in which
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a central place is cleared for the taking care of and nourishing of
beneﬁcial connections between people and their life stories.
© 2010 Association ALTER. Published by Elsevier Masson SAS.
All rights reserved.
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r é s u m é
L’inclusion sociale est un des objectifs importants de la gestion
et de la pratique de soin et d’accompagnement des personnes
ayant un handicap mental. Cependant, l’idée d’inclusion sociale,
ses présuppositions et ses effets ne sont pas tout à fait clairs.
Guidé par l’exigence de clarté, l’auteur se réfère à des analyses
culturelles et historiques, sociologiques et philosophiques de
l’altérité et examine à nouveau l’intégration de l’autre dans la
pensée, le discours et la société. Une perspective alternative de
l’inclusion est offerte, dans laquelle l’attention ne se porte pas
sur des mesures d’ordre politique, législatif ou administratif mais
davantage sur le dialogue reliant les gens, en ouvrant ce dialogue
à l’échange de récits de vie personnelle. Dans la seconde partie
de cette contribution sont développés quelques fondements
théoriques de cette approche narrative. Sont également explorées
les conditions d’un espace dans lequel le dialogue sur les récits
de vie peut s’épanouir. Le rôle des personnes ayant un handicap
mental, comme acteurs et auteurs de récits de vie est expliqué.
Il est souligné dans la conclusion que tous les paradigmes de la
prise en charge de personnes ayant un handicap mental, y compris
le paradigme de citoyenneté, souffrent d’une dichotomie où
s’exerce une hégémonie gênant l’inclusion sociale. Un paradigme
de rencontre est alors proposé pour fonder l’idée, et la pratique,
selon laquelle prendre soin des liens entre les personnes et leurs
récits de vie, et les fortiﬁer, tiennent une place centrale.
© 2010 Association ALTER. Publié par Elsevier Masson SAS. Tous
droits réservés.
Introduction
The ﬁlm released in 2005by the Swedish director Kay Pollack, As It Is in Heaven, includes a scene
in which Tore, a young man with intellectual disability, enters a church during a choir rehearsal and
announces that he wants to join the choir. The manager of the choir, the boy’s uncle, explains to the
choir that his nephew cannot read or write and cannot read music at all, that he is backward, can
hardly speak an intelligible word and is a constant burden for others. Moreover, he will bring down
the level of the choir, which has just risen somewhat because of the new director. When neither the
choir members nor the director see these considerations as sufﬁcient reason to refuse to let Tore join
the choir, the uncle loses his temper. He had such great plans for the choir, and that was what he was
working for day and night. It would not look good at all to have such a backward boy among them at
the yearly choir festival. This choir would never amount to anything.
This scenedeviateshardly fromwhatoftenhappens in realitywhenpeoplewith intellectual disabil-
itywant to participate in communal activitieswhich everyone else takes for granted. The participation
of peoplewith intellectual disability not infrequently turns out to be an undermining of existing habits
and conventional views and of the social, philosophical and theological ideas that lie at their basis.
The breach of ethos is frightening for many people.
Reconsidering social inclusion
For people with intellectual disabilities, the obstinacy of existing concepts of humanity and the
accompanying normative views leads to their remaining caught in patterns of care and treatment that
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do not enable them to participate in the ‘family of man’ and to make their own contribution to society.
As long as intelligence, grades and level of education are decisive for social success, intellectually
disabled people will remain the ‘socially inferior people’ they have been since the nineteenth century.
The core problem of social inclusion seems to be the conﬂict between the lived reality of people
with intellectual disability and the normative ethical frameworks that dominate our society. Such
frameworks come to practical expression in the roles that are available in society. These roles are
predeﬁned through upbringing and education and reﬂect primarily the views and power relationships
of the existing intellectual and material order.
This is even thecase indiscourseson ‘integration’ or ‘inclusion’. Formanyyears, integrationhasbeen
the main starting point with respect to policy, management and practice of organized care for people
with intellectual disability. But the conceptualization and the moral presuppositions of this policy
have not been clear at all (Clegg, Murphy, Almack & Harvey, 2008). With respect to conceptualization,
relationships are formed with concepts such as ‘community care’ or ‘community living’. van Gennep
(1994) distinguished three dimensions of integration. The ﬁrst is independent or supported living
in an ordinary residential area or neighborhood which he labels as ‘physical’ integration. The use of
regular services for education, work, leisure time, and health and welfare care is labeled as ‘functional’
integration. Having available a network of relationships with people other than family members or
professionals is called ‘social’ integration. Empirical research suggests that this ultimate goal of social
integration has hardly been realized even in situations of full physical integration (Cummins & Lau,
2003). There seems to be a relative independence of spatial location and having social relationships. It
probably is the other way around: having social relationships seems to be a more important condition
for access to usual community services and facilities – the ‘functional integration’ as it is understood
by Van Gennep - than living in an ordinary neighborhood as such. Although the opposite is explicitly
what is intended,many practices of ‘community building’ tend towards homogeneity and assimilation
(Fendler, 2006, p. 315).
All activities labeled as ‘integration’ or ‘inclusion’ thus occur within a normative framework that
is dominated by political, geographical, administrative, organizational and economic factors. In that
framework, individual autonomy and freedom of choice predominate. Social and cultural factors are
generally underexposed. This one-sided moral frame of reference and the policies based on it do not
take into account the concrete interactions between people who are largely strangers to one another.
Therefore, it proved able only in a limited way to offer answers to the desire of many people with
disability to be counted and to participate in their own living environment, in the social context of
their immediate vicinity and in wider society.
This does not mean that integration has failed; it means that both concept and practices need to
be seriously reconsidered. Hall also holds that a reconceptualization of social integration is very much
needed:
“. . .social inclusion policy and alternative networks of inclusion both perpetuate exclusion,
as the discriminatory contexts are left unchanged and inclusion within people with learning
disability networks ignores broader exclusionary processes.” (Hall, 2005, p. 113).
An exploratory analysis
People who are physically, psychologically or cognitively different have always been marginalized
throughout history. At the same time, in all periods and all cultures peoplewho are perceived as differ-
ent have also been presented as symbols of the essence of being human. This paradox constitutes the
focusof theanalysis thatHenri-JacquesStikerundertook inhisbookCorps inﬁrmes et sociétés, published
for the ﬁrst time 25years ago, translated into English ten years ago, but hardly noticed in the Nether-
lands (Stiker, 1999). Driven by the questionwhy societies attempt to integrate peoplewith a disability,
Stikerwrites thehistory of amindset.What is behind that intention of integration?According to Stiker,
integration is amuchmore important constant inhuman society than exclusion. It is an arrogant preju-
dice to presuppose that our time,with its political andmanagerial striving for the integration of people
with disabilities, implies a radical liberation from a preceding period in which people with disabilities
were only excluded or eliminated (pp. 15-16). This moralizing ideological position obscures the fact
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that exclusion and inclusion can have inﬁnitely different forms and reasons and can sometimes even
be two sides of the same coin. For Stiker, the question is what societies say about themselves, if they
exclude people in one way or another or if they want to include people in one way or another.
The heart of Stiker’s analysis is that in Western thinking the ‘being other’ of people – and every
period in the history ofWestern culture has deﬁned that in its ownway – always appears as something
that must be assimilated or and thus disappear. A society’s claim to be decent depends on the extent
to which physical, psychological and cognitive differences are less visible. This integration can be
achieved via various assimilation strategies, but the background of such strategies includes an ideal
of a society in which differences between people are erased. Stiker shows that strategies of thinking,
speaking and acting can be found in all periods through which it was attempted to have people who
deviated physically, psychologically or cognitively adapt to the social norms that obtained for the
period in question.
According to Stiker, these strategies of ‘social erasure’ reached their peak in the second half of
the twentieth century. The ideal of integration was then based on a principle of rehabilitation that
included the notion that all differences can ultimately be erased. That will happen via scientiﬁcally
developed prosthetics, training and exercise regimes and medical intervention. That will also hap-
pen by cultivating the wish of individuals with disability to adapt to current social norms. Our time,
according to Stiker, sees the appearance of a culture in which it is attempted to complete the project of
identiﬁcation, of making everyone equal to one another. In his view, this project will result in people
with disability being swallowed up into a large and uniform social collective. Physical exclusionwould
no longer be needed. The technocratically and economically oriented society terms each disability into
a ‘support need’ that every citizen may have, therefore something for which no one need be ashamed
and which can be provided through administrative, technical and commercial ways. But, Stiker says,
behind this smooth social fac¸ade thedifferences, the contradictions and looseendsof existence remain,
and people know that all too well (p. 131). The problem in contemporary society does not lie so much
in a lack of integration as in forcing an integration through science, technology and politics in which
identity in the sense of the convergence of the ‘equal’ and the ‘ordinary’ dominates. The integration
that arises via legislation, ﬁnancing and socialization of care is consequently one of forgetfulness, dis-
appearance, assimilation and conformity. Without saying it in so many words, Stiker sketches a ‘new
conﬁnement’ of people with disability: the conﬁnement within the ordinary, the familiar, the socially
accepted. According to him, the background of this new conﬁnement includes an ill-considered accep-
tance of an empirical normality, a logic of the ‘ordinary’ that construes the ‘extraordinary’ or ‘special’
as a threat or a danger, or at least as a necessary evil (p. 143).
Contemporary philosophical and sociological analyses
Stiker’s analysis shows – despite great differences regarding perspective and method – remarkable
parallels with Zygmunt Bauman’s sociological analysis of the ‘stranger’ in modern and postmodern
culture (Bauman, 1997) and the analysis of philosophical interpretations of alterity byRichardKearney
in his Strangers, Gods and Monsters (2003). Kearney’s main hypothesis is that people project uncon-
scious fears of the strange that they encounter ﬁrst and foremost in themselves onto others.We do not
acknowledge that the human condition consists in being continuously agitated by the confrontation
with an alterity, a strangeness that is present in ourselves (Kearney, 2003, p. 5). Instead, we ﬂee by
way of various escape strategies, the most important of which is the stigmatization of the other as an
outsider, as a stranger who can take on the mythical qualities of a monster or a god. Where Kearney
sees a collective cultural unconscious as a basis for the exclusion, Bauman, being a sociologist, is inter-
ested primarily in the way in which social and cultural practices make the stranger a counter-image
par excellence of modernity: purity, rationality and order. According to sociologists who think along
the same lines as Bauman, the ‘postmodern’ idolatry of difference, strangeness and alterity (Kearney,
2003, p. 229) is simply the masking of the domination of new criteria and thus of new thresholds for
full inclusion in the culture of modernity. An important criterion behind this so-called ‘postmodern’
thinking consists in the ability and willingness to consume (Bauman, 1997). Other criteria originate
from the inclination of our current visual culture for aesthetic normalization and the valuation inher-
ent to that of ideal standards of beauty, health, youthfulness and genetic perfection (Hughes, 2000;
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Hughes, 2002). Such criteria often prove to be fatal for the way in which people with disability are
seen.
Returning to Stiker from this small detour via Bauman and Kearney, we notice the following. What
we would consider processes of exclusion in social reality, he deﬁnes as integration strategies on
the level of thought. Our culture understands strangeness and difference only by normalizing them,
obscuring or eliminating them, by underestimating or overestimating them (Stiker, 1999, p. 183). And
conversely: much of what is presented in politics and care policy as integration strategy is nothing
else than a cosmetic artifact that is to mask the stubborn reality of exclusion from the prevailing
conceptions of the world and humanity. Joel Kahn (2001) points to the paradox that, because of its
embeddedness in concrete and historical circumstances, the modern idea of a universal humanity
encompassing all diversity, as expressed in rationality and autonomy, always has its ‘others’ and thus
brings with it processes of social exclusion. “In this sense, universalism is a culture like any other,
differing only in that it always fails to recognize itself as such” (Kahn, 2001, p. 23). As this recognition
fails, those who are excluded must be brought back from the periphery to the homogenized and
idealized centre of society. Stiker speaks in this context of a ‘technocracy of absorption’ (Stiker, 1999,
pp. 132, 164, 192). There seems to be hardly any awareness of the exclusion mechanisms implied in
this technocratic strategy.
A provisional deﬁnition of social integration
It is remarkable that analyses, such as those by Stiker, BaumanandKearney are almost entirely lack-
ing in political, scientiﬁc and policy discussions concerning the integration of people with intellectual
disability. There are, however, important reasons for breaking this silence. Such analyses challenge us
to deﬁne more sharply what we are talking about when we talk about social integration or inclusion.
They can open our eyes to the pitfalls of an integration philosophy that is not very conscious of its
disciplining, assimilating and normalizing meanings and functions and of its one-sided concentration
on the physical/spatial dimension of integration. These analyses have a practical meaning because
they can serve as a critical mirror for current political and organizational practices. They thus point
out a way to practices in which people with disabilities cannot simply be made invisible or even elimi-
nated but in which the dialogue is opened with the unusual or the unnamable, with that which evokes
resistance.
Thus these analyses contribute to a new view of social integration in which the attention is not
directed primarily at setting up the government apparatus, the infrastructure of care economics or the
organization of care but at connecting people. Traces of such a view of the discourse on social inclu-
sion/exclusion can already be found in reﬂections of a number of social scientists and philosophers on
racial or ethnic diversity. Iwill describe this view in termsof the followingprovisional deﬁnition. Social
integration is not a characteristic of a situation or of people in a situation. Rather, social integration is
an interpersonal process that helps to acknowledge and value people who feel themselves strangers
or are seen by others as strangers in their uniqueness, thus not in spite of but with the characteristics
(limitations and differences) that are perceived as strange.
This deﬁnition implies a breaking up of each suggestion of a conditional or causal connection
between the so-called ‘physical’ and ‘functional’ integration on the one hand and social integration on
the other. It offers space to assess activities that concern ‘physical’ and ‘functional’ integration in the
light of their actual contribution to social integration. Conversely, it offers insight into the processes
of social integration as the condition of possibility for functional and physical integration. At least as
important is the fact that such a deﬁnition removes the appearance that people who live or stay in a
protected environment – and that is often people with serious intellectual or multiple disabilities –
are not or should not be involved in processes of social integration. A perspective of social integration
as an interpersonal process is that people who live with disability will participate in a community that
provides a positive contribution to their search for a meaningful existence and that they are accepted
and recognized in their contribution to that community.
In this view of social integration, all emphasis is placed on interpersonal processes and the social
and cultural aspects they entail. For future practices of contact with people with disability (Stiker,
1999, p. 195f) recommends to bring into motion processes and initiatives that help the social fabric
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around people with disability to accept differences. I will argue that life stories can play an important
role in these processes and initiatives. They have the potential to open the dialogue with the unusual
and thus to create connections between people. As Pols, Miedema and Levering state: “Stories can
show how the ordinary and the exceptional can exist beside each other. Stories always concern the
special integration of the normal and the deviating. The crazy and the bad, the boring and exciting,
the morbid and the terrifying can be discussed in the story. The story is able to show the ordinary
and the exceptional. The story can take the exceptional from its situation of rejection in which it has
been pushed by the scientiﬁc report or by general opinion. But the story is also able to show what is
exceptional about the ordinary.” (Pols, Miedema, & Levering, 1995, p. 15).
Connecting stories
Social integration as an interpersonal process, as I have described it, arises and ﬂourishes where
stories about people are told and heard. In this context the term ‘stories’ refers primarily to people’s
life stories. By linking social integration with life stories, I am joining a broad tradition of narra-
tive approaches in theology, philosophy, literary studies, social sciences and, in particular, ethics. In
that tradition stories are seen as constitutive for the identity of persons and groups (Kearney, 2002;
Meininger, 2006; Polkinghorne, 1988; Ricoeur, 1986; Ricoeur, 1988; Ricoeur, 1990). In the practices
of storytelling I discuss here, it is primarily this identity constituting and socially connecting function
of storytelling that is at issue. This is, of course, not separate from the function of representation but
it does not merge with it entirely (Kearney, 2002, p. 153). The question I want to answer is: what, in
stories, is connected with what, who with whom and also who is connected with what?
Stories connect the storyteller with his/her own life
Telling the story of a life is, in the ﬁrst place, connecting disparate events in time and space so that
they form a coherence that can be described by concepts like ‘plot’ or ‘story line’. It is an attempt to
experience the coherence of life in a narrative way (Kearney, 2002, pp. 129–131). In that sense, telling
a story is the same as connecting: a synthesis is sought in the plurality of events, actions, encounters,
plans, successes, failures, unintended consequences and interactions. When telling a story, I connect
myself with what is strange in myself as well, the other that disquietingly determines me, that is
present and evades my grasp. Here fragmentation, discontinuity or breaks cannot be ignored: it is
not a matter of constructing a unity but rather one of seeking connections. This quest consists in
experiments of selection and reorganization in which one attempts to transcend the pure succession
of events, theunconnectedness of ups anddowns and thepresent experienceof them in an imaginative
way. Telling a story makes the real world a world of meanings and of possibilities. This is the ‘mimetic’
or re-creative function of the story (Kearney, 2002, pp. 131–135). In telling a story, one spans an
arch between memory and expectation, between coming to grips with the past and looking into
an unknown future. Second, in telling stories, a connection occurs between the storyteller and the
conﬁguration that occurs in the story. The storyteller does not represent himself but yields himself
physically as the narrator; he makes himself present as the author of the story: this is my life, this is
who I am, this is my doubt, my hope, my struggle. In this unique way, I am connected with myself and
at the same time a stranger to myself. Stories thus connect the events in a signiﬁcant way and stories
connect the storyteller to the narrated conﬁguration of the events that the narrator is.
Stories connect storyteller and listener
A plurality of connections with other people and other worlds is embedded in the connections
cited above. Stories connect because they are always addressed and situated: they are always told to
someone and they are told in certain contexts. The meanings ascribed by the storyteller are addressed
meanings, i.e. meanings that are intended to be shared and responded to. This has consequences,
of course, for what is told and how it is told: in the narrative situation the conventional roles and
distinctions, such as the distinction between ‘care provider’ and ‘client’ can be temporarily breached.
Stories make the storyteller and the listener into someone else by, among other things, offering them
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the opportunity to walk in someone else’s shoes and to experience the lot of the other in concern and
distance, as if we are the strange other. Kearney calls this the catharsis function of the story (2002,
pp. 137–142). He holds that this ability of stories to move us to empathy with the strange other –
the stranger, the better, he says literally – not only implies an appeal to our imagination but also to
our moral sensitivity (Kearney, 2002, p. 139; Ricoeur, 1990, pp. 193–198). Storyteller and listener are
both addressed with respect to their understanding of the other and also their self-understanding. In
the strange other, they encounter at the same time the strangeness in and alienation from themselves
(Ntourou, 2007, p. 233).
Stories connect storyteller and listener to others
Stories also connect the storyteller and listener to others, because the events that are beingnarrated
consist primarily in encounters with other people and other worlds. Telling stories always proceeds
via the other. Someone tellswhohe is by telling others about his relationship to other people and other
things and circumstances. He is not an isolated individual; he is a son, brother, husband, father, friend,
student, colleague, spectator, fellow-sufferer. The way to myself is a way that runs inevitably via the
other. And the other is always someone who, just like me, tells who he is through his story about his
relationship to me and to others. People do not only participate in one another’s stories; the story
of the one constitutes the story of the other. People thus receive their existence from one another.
Remembering, narrative remembering, is a social practice par excellence (Middleton & Hewitt, 1999).
In telling stories, therefore, both the identity of the storyteller as well as that of the listener comes
into play, as well as those of others who play a role in their stories.
Stories connect storyteller and listener to judgments about the ‘Good Life’
Stories connect because in addition to being a social practice, storytelling is also a moral practice
(Kearney, 1999). Stories imply claims to a morally meaningful social existence and not infrequently
include explicit moral commentary. Because the story is addressed, storytelling is implicitly also
always a persuasion: the view of the world that the storyteller presents to the listener or hearer
is never ethically neutral. It invites the reader or listener to a renewed evaluation of the other, himself
and the world. It attempts to move the reader or listener to a certain moral judgment of the characters
and their actions. Stories thus always contain claims with respect to the good life in an ethical sense
– claims that are grounded in the personal engagement of the storyteller. At the same time, it calls
the listener or reader to relate to the different proposals for the good life with and for others in just
institutions that come to expression in stories (Ricoeur, 1988, p. 249). Such claims can sometimes
bring moral differences to light that lead to a break between people. They can also lead to redemption,
reconciliation and restoration. In any case, the event of telling and retelling stories has consequences
for social relationships.
Stories connect storyteller and listener to suprapersonal stories
The nature and possibilities that stories have to connect different times, places and peoplewith one
another are also determined by the web of metanarratives of which all our stories are part and with
which they are connected through visible and invisible threads (Baldwin, 2005). By metanarratives
I mean suprapersonal stories that people understand by means of a more or less ﬁxed concept of
humanity, disease or theory. A culture has ‘pre-scribed’ stories about what is ‘normal’, ‘adjusted’,
‘healthy’, or simply ‘sick’, ‘insane’ or ‘monstrous’. People are not only a source of stories; they are also
the subject of political, scientiﬁc and cultural stories. Such stories derive their content from countless
private stories. They also inﬂuence the stories and thus the personal identity of individuals and the
collective identity of groups in society. The connection can be so formulated that the metanarratives
‘preﬁgure’ the narrative aspect of individual life. Ricoeur views this preﬁguration as a ﬁrst step in the
threefold ‘mimesis’ of preﬁguration as the ‘pre-imaging’ of the story, conﬁguration as the telling of
the story, in which someone becomes partly detached from the preﬁguration and reﬁguration as the
renewed creative turn to the reality of one’s own existence (Kearney, 2002, p. 133). Thus, personal
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identity is an important factor in politics and, conversely, politics is always closely connected with
personal life stories. We cannot understand an individual life if we do not also consider it as part of
a social and public sphere. Moreover, people are subjects of scientiﬁc stories in which being human
and life in this world are often portrayed as a system of objectiﬁable structures and functions that can
be identiﬁed and compared. There, all attention is directed to those aspects in which people are the
same and to that which connects them to nature. These scientiﬁc stories contain series of assertions
about the ‘what’ of the human being and thus also about the ‘what’ of individual variations, the ‘what’
of deviations, disturbances, diseases or defects.
Stories connect storyteller and listener to religious stories
In life stories, storytellers often connect themselves explicitly or implicitlywith stories that are even
more encompassing than the above-mentioned suprapersonal metanarratives. I am referring here to
religious narratives,which are also called ‘master narratives’. By this term, Kearney (2003) refers to the
great mythical and religious narrative traditions that are the formative forces of cultures and portray
people in relationship to the cosmic or the transcendent. Aside from the fact that they are supraper-
sonal, they also testify to an involvement with a reality that is experienced transcendentally and can
be expressed in various forms of religious life. In religious stories of different traditions, God is present
as a transcendent reality that is related to our reality and to all interpretations of it. This involvement
with transcendence makes it possible to see and experience in new ways the ‘ordinary’ reality that
arises in one’s own life story but also in all the metanarratives with which it is interwoven. Life stories
also manifest their profound relational character where they touch or are connected with religious
stories or aspects of them. The relationship with God or the divine in the story is experienced as a
relationship that radically affects one’s self-image and all relationships with others and with reality.
Metanarratives and master narratives in relation to people with intellectual disability
The lives and life stories of peoplewith intellectual disability are – just like those of all of us – closely
connected with metanarratives of various kinds. They are, for example, interwoven with the political
metanarrative that characterizes them as vital and mature citizens in a modern democracy; but they
are also interwoven with the economic metanarrative that portrays them as consumers in a care mar-
ket that reacts ﬂexibly to their preferences. They are intertwined with the biomedical metanarrative
that describes them as impaired or disturbed, deviant or dysfunctional. They are intertwined with
the social metanarrative that portrays them as unadjusted, as dropouts, as a collective burden or as
socially superﬂuous, but also sometimes as heroes who overcome their limitations and achieve their
dreams. They are interwoven with the metanarratives of the ideology of care that view them as fellow
human beings who are to be cared for, developed, emancipated, empowered or supported. Stories
of people with disability are, ﬁnally, interwoven with religious master narratives and their culture-
and time-bound interpretations. These can be stories in which disease and disability are viewed as
punishment for sin, as purifying trials, as the work of the devil, or even as a gift that entails a task.
Without connections to such metanarratives, people cannot become the source of narratives that
they as people are, regardless of whether they have intellectual disabilities or not. Nevertheless, it
appears from this consideration that suchmetanarratives can also be serious hindrances. That happens
in particular if such ametanarrative has hardened into a cliché or if it is viewed as a stereotype inwhich
all personal narratives are toﬁt or shouldﬁt. In such a context, it is adequate to speakof narrativedenial
or expropriation, and institutionalized narrativity. It is a form of narrativity from which all doubt, rela-
tivization, nuancing, ambiguity and contradiction have been ﬁltered away. Thus, the life stories inter-
woven with that form of narrativity can become constricted in the straightjacket of simplicity. Con-
necting is then perverted into annexation and assimilation. Metanarratives then no longer invite one
to dialogue, imagination and reinterpretation but drive one into subjection, adjustment and imitation.
Thus, metanarratives sometimes constrain and subjugate people and sometimes they liberate
and emancipate. And it is of great importance to know what the difference between the two is
(Kearney, 2003, p. 179). The search for that difference requires a hermeneutics, a continuing process of
explaining, a practice of moral reﬂection and moral imagination. The ‘better story’ always needs to be
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found via reinterpretation and retelling. It is better in the sense that it connects more adequately than
a previous story to the perspective of a meaningful existence. Not only are the storyteller, the listener
and their life stories involved in that hermeneutic. The reality mediated by the story is also involved,
as well as the individuals and their relationships involved in that reality. Thus, metanarratives and
master narratives are subject to a continuous reinterpretation. Narrative ethics then is not primarily
an ethical theory but a hermeneutical practice that searches for the proper relationship, in the proper
context, at the right moment, with taking proper proximity in the distance from, and proper distance
in the proximity to the other and to the metanarratives and master narratives that are interwoven
with the story of the other and of oneself as listener (Meininger, 2005, pp. 109–112).
In summary: stories connect people in several ways with themselves, with one another and with
human life and society in culture and society. In this connecting telling of stories, the strange is not
denied or shoved aside but met in the conversation of people with themselves and with others. That
does not mean that every connection that is made is also humane, beneﬁcial and promotes processes
of social integration. It does mean that no process of social integration is conceivable without having
its starting point in a careful hermeneutics of the voice that is heard in the life story, the life world
that is unlocked by the story and the connections that the story implies or to which it invites the
listener. The ignoring or underestimating of stories of people with intellectual disability as well as the
powerlessness or even unwillingness to listen to those stories is a serious hindrance to each prospect
of renewal of engrained conventions and ideas.
Connecting stories: an event within practices
I have deﬁned social integration as an interpersonal process in which the conversation with the
stranger is opened. Now I discuss the question of where this narrative event is localized and what this
means in social integration processes of people with intellectual disability.
The conversation with the stranger constantly arises within different social and societal life areas
and the practices cohering with them. It can concern practices within the family or wider family,
school, professional training or hobby courses,work, friends, the church, themosque, the sports clubor
supporters’ club. Sometimes, suchpractices are setup speciﬁcally forpeoplewith intellectual disability
with this goal in mind. That can be of shorter or longer duration and organized or not by or with the
help of professional care givers: friends, buddy projects, coffee groups, ‘multilogue’ meetings (Kal,
2001), open houses, social network projects and various initiatives in the sphere of education, work,
leisure time activities and faith communities as well as within existing forms of care provision and
social services. Assuming we know that the pure existence of these ‘inclusive’ practices does not in
itself guarantee that they are actually a space for connecting stories, the question is now: under what
conditions do these practices actually invite people to tell their stories, to listen to them, to exchange
and to connect and what role can people with intellectual disability play as actors?
Space between the logics
People’s stories can be connected with one another if there is room to allow the stories to be told
and even to listen to them. ‘Space’ is needed. That space must be created within all the cited practices.
But what kind of space is that and where is it situated? As far as situating is concerned, we can state
that in any case it concerns a social space, (which of course presupposes the presence of physical and
temporal space). BothKearney and Stiker state that acceptance of and respect for differences cannot be
expected of collective social structures. They are skeptical regarding the political and administrative
organization of integration because it ignores the social exclusion that is part and parcel of our culture.
Edward Hall has pointed to this by stating: “While social inclusion policy is concerned with providing
access to the (economic) spaces of the majority, it pays little attention to the structures and attitudes
that dominate in such spaces, the transformation of which people with learning disabilities arguably
desire.” (Hall, 2005, p. 113).
Only in a direct social environment in which people are not anonymous to one another can people
separate themselves from thedisciplining, assimilating and annexing forces that dominate in a society.
Stiker (1999, p. 199) speaks of ‘black markets’, of a ‘shadow economy’ of social relationships, a social
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space that consists in an ‘underground network’ of small-scale local initiatives that runs through all
state institutions, the market, the public sphere, ‘civil society’ and the private domain and that is not
concerned with the dividing lines that are drawn in theory and practice between these areas. The
space at issue here can be described best as a space in between, a niche or sanctuary that would
indeed be helped by a material embedding (in services, social institutions and buildings) but does
not derive its existence and nourishing sources from that material embedding. For this kind of space,
Michel Foucault has used the term ‘heterotopia’ (Foucault, 1986). The German special educationalist
Dreher speaks in this connection of an ‘A-topia’, the space between a starting point that represents the
ordinary and familiar and an uncertain ﬁnal destination in which the transformation into inclusive
thinking and acting will be completed (Ntourou, 2007, p. 255).
The special educationalist van Weelden already saw that more than 20years ago, arguing for what
he called a ‘space for intimacy’ (van Weelden, 1986, p. 45). That refers to a space where people with
disability can meet others in such a way that the prejudice and resistance invoked by the mutual
strangeness can be faced up to. In such a space, an interaction can occur in which the uniqueness and
strangeness of the partners is recognized and not subjugated to the yoke of general ideas of ‘ordinary
everyday life’, ‘normal existence’ or ‘integrated living’. Such a ‘space for intimacy’ is, according to
van Weelden, formed primarily by people who are in a personal relationship with the person with
disability: parents, family members, friends, as well as teachers, supervisors, caregivers and others.
It is the space where stories are told, can be connected with one another, and thereby can create
new moral space. As a consequence, a transformation in thinking, speaking and acting can occur that
invokes new meanings and a new way of acting in life and society by all those involved. Uniqueness,
strangeness and communality can then develop into a conﬁguration in which the one dimension does
not overshadow or suppress the other (Ntourou, 2007, p. 257).
Countering processes of marginalization and exclusion, such a space, niche or sanctuary has the
potential to make and nourish connections between people in which difference and strangeness are
allowed to remain. Some characteristics of such a space are the following (Kal, 2001, pp. 52–75):
• the personwith intellectual disability knows that he or she iswelcome, even if he or she is not able to
express joy, suffering, lack and desire in line with the prevailing codes and in recognized vocabulary.
That which remains without speech and vague is not denied by actively shouting it down. Others
will expose themselves to it and come through it with perseverance. Accommodation is offered to
people who cannot be ‘accommodated’;
• the space is characterized by hospitality. People have time; there is room to offer emotional support
and communal activities are sought that can be experienced as meaningful. People are enabled to
experience themselves as acting subjects and thus to develop self-esteem;
• the space is characterized by a suspension of the goal-means rationality that is determinative for
organized care and support. It does not concern producing ‘evidence-based’ effects of care and sup-
port methodologies, ‘making something’ or ‘producing something’, but being present and together
experiencing that which is considered to be of value. In such a sanctuary, the ideology of normality
is suspended. The ‘Stachel des Fremden’ remains a thorn in the ﬂesh of the culture of self-sufﬁciency
and emancipation, independence and rationality (Waldenfels, 1998). It remains a continuing appeal
for a response that cannot ﬁnd purchase in what is known and familiar;
• in all of this, this space is a space for dia-logue, literally, a ‘speaking among’, that moves among or
between different logics. The dialogue derives its transforming effect not from the arrangement of
a certain discourse but from its disturbing and offensive but sometimes also liberating ability to put
all logics in the shade (Ntourou, 2007, pp. 253-254). That is the transforming experience that parents
witness when they relate that life with their disabled child has taught them to look at the world and
themselves in an entirely different way. And fortunately, that experience is not only reserved for
them.
In such a space, the connecting power of stories can blossom in a beneﬁcial way. Everything that is
done in society under the adage of social integration deserves the nameonly if it has the characteristics
of this space. It can be created in families, schools, church choirs, faith communities, neighborhoods
and societies, as well as in traditional protected forms of living and care. It can be organized as a
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fordable place in the great stream of dominant conventions and views. Then, all the practices cited
can become places of and for all those concerned, places where loneliness and social superﬂuity can
be actively combated. These ‘other spaces’ function as a mirror for all those spaces that are considered
‘real’ or ‘normal’ (Foucault, 1986, p. 24). Such a space consists primarily of people who have gradually
discovered or want to discover that the disruption by the strange, the unsuitable and what cannot be
accommodated brings its own order. These are people who want to be reminded of the fact that they
themselves are strangers (Meininger, 2008). Concrete examples of this kind of spaces can be found
in all those encounters, places and events where ‘being with’ persons with intellectual disabilities
is emphasized instead of ‘doing something for’ them. These spaces can be found where intrinsically
motivated people choose to share (part of) their life with people with intellectual disabilities as for
instance in the communities of l’Arche (Reinders, 2008), or in buddy programs or friendship circles
(Novak Amado, 1993; Perske, 1988). But even within a professional care setting sometimes niches,
moments and personal encounters can be found that disclose a space for storied dialogue.
Actors: people with intellectual disability
The contextual diversity of this space ensures that all kinds of actors can play a role in it. Each of
the actors merits attention, but I want to take a closer look at the most important actors: people with
intellectual disability. Although stories have intrinsic connecting powers, it is precisely the stories of
such people that seem to be particularly vulnerable in practice. They are scarcely heard, because they
seldom or never meet the norms of articulative ability, rationality and coherence that prevail in usual
social discourse. That vulnerability is stronger for those whose very ability to be the authors of their
own life stories is doubted.
I will point to only a few aspects.
First, the hindered ability for narrative expression and communication plays a role. Baldwin (2005,
p. 1026) points out that this is true only if narrativity is viewedone-sidedly as verbal action. Itwould be
amisconception to think that the connectingpowerof stories applies only to thosewhoare able to tell a
reasonably coherent story throughusingwords andnot, for example, topeoplewithprofoundmultiple
disabilities. If verbal communication is hindered, there are many non-verbal interaction methods
available that can help someone tell his or her own story. It is important here that we do not set a
standard beforehand for what can be called a ‘story’ but pay attention to the ‘little stories’ that are
concealed in the everyday. People who do not speak often possess a range of non-verbal, physical and
symbolic forms of expression that admit a narrative explanation. Non-verbal behavioral expressions,
however, are seldom seen as a story because of, for example, the strange codiﬁcation which can be
extremely uncontrolled in one person and extremely inhibited in another. In such cases expressions
are not heard or read in a narrative way, i.e. with a view to the internal and external connections
that are contained in stories. It requires the conversation partner to ‘listen to whispering’, which
presupposes a subtle feel for messages in tiny or on the contrary in grotesque signs, a listening that
helps in conﬁguring the life story.
A second aspect concerns the doubt of such people being able to be the authors of their life stories
at all. We saw above that ‘text’ can refer to expressions in narrative practice that are entirely different
from the spoken or written word that, for that matter, in itself already refers to physical processes in
which a person opens himself up for another. Moreover, if we realize that a text comes to completion
only in the embodied appropriation by the reader or listener, then there is no reason to deny people
with intellectual disability, even if they have profound multiple disabilities, authorship over their life
stories. Of course, the access to authorship, the ‘who’ of the person with disability, makes unusual
detours necessary. But more fundamental is that each person – already only because he or she is a
child of parents – is in any case the co-author of the life stories of those who live with him or her.
Conversely, each person consists to an important extent of the stories that others tell about him or
her and the others are, in turn, co-authors of his or her story. The questions that intellectual disability
entails with respect to the telling and connecting of stories thus do not have to be denied or trivialized.
It is important to view them from the perspective of the interwovenness of all our life stories.
A third aspect concerns the dialogical and mutual character of the connecting of stories. Dialogue
should not be burdened either with normative ideas about mutuality as a deliberative relationship of
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exchange in which giving and taking are balanced. Such criteria do exclude in advance many people
with intellectual disability from all dialogue. True dialogue cannot be connected with criteria as a
shared starting point or a common aim; it requires radical openness. Dialogue with people with intel-
lectual disability – and by the way also dialogue with all others – is not concerned with a relationship
of exchange but with a relationship of response. It is precisely the difference, the strangeness, the lack
of equality, the asymmetry in experience, social position and language, the feared breach of the ethos,
the always incomplete response to the appeal of the other, the hope for and the amazement about
a possibly new perspective that are driving forces behind dialogue. Wherever dialogue is carried out
in this way people with intellectual disability are full partners. The partners with disability pose the
question to others as to how responsive they actually are if they make their views and conventions
with respect to education, work, care, being church, as well as those with respect to participation in
sports, doing science or making love the norm for everyone.
People with intellectual disability are actors in the processes of social integration. But processes
of social integration can come into existence and blossom only in interaction with all other actors.
The burdens of this process must not be shifted one-sidedly to people with intellectual disability. The
learning process to be undergone is also a learning process for all those others in society who do not
bear the label ‘intellectual disability’.
A paradigm of encounter
Current professional care is only able to give form to the space of dialogue if existing care paradigms
are transcended, including the technically and methodologically oriented forms of implementation
and the stronglymanagerial and functionally fragmented formsof organization theyhaveproduced. At
the background of the medically-oriented defective paradigm, the behavioral science-oriented devel-
opment paradigmand thepolitically-oriented support paradigm there is a persistent basic assumption
of hierarchy and hegemony. This basic assumption is that people without disability, whether they be
doctors, educationalists or support workers, have something that people with disability do not have
and that the opposite is not the case. This basic assumption lives from binary distinctions between
autonomy and dependence, normal and abnormal, self and other as separate individuals. It overlooks
how relationships that people without disability would judge as dependence relationships in a nega-
tive sense can, from the perspective of peoplewith disability, entail connections that in fact strengthen
their subject status. These dichotomies cohere closely with a subject-object schema that can be found
in the rehabilitation idea that, according to Stiker’s analysis, determines the image of care and support
in our time. This schema is encountered no less in the care paradigms that have been distinguished in
recent decades, including the current citizenship paradigm. In contemporary thought, the hierarchy
and hegemony seem to be opposed by the view of persons with disability as clients in a market, as
full fellow citizens, as mature consumers who purchase care like a commodity. This metanarrative,
however, is many cases nothing more than a concealment of differences between people that should
be relevant – politically as well. It runs the risk of deteriorating into a rhetoric that obscures the devel-
opment of new forms of dependence. We see these new forms of dependence arise where people
with intellectual disability come up against the limits of the struggle to be ‘just like everyone else’,
the limits of the idea that they can have unlimited freedom of choice and complete control over their
lives. We see the new dependence arise in the loneliness, poverty and social superﬂuity from which
many people with intellectual disability suffer and in the abuse that is made of them in various forms,
regardless of the place where or the setting in which they live or stay.
To the extent that professional care reﬂects such a hierarchical division – and this is often the case
– it is not able to set up, nourish and look after spaces for intimacy. But it is not by deﬁnition the
case that professional care is not able to do so. Professional care can be digniﬁed and dignifying. Care
providers can become attentive listeners to the stories of their clients. They can, together with their
clients, search for beneﬁcial interpretations of that story by connecting it with the stories of others
and with their own stories. But if professional care is going to be able to do that, then it needs to
say farewell to the categorical subject-object schema that lies within each of the cited paradigms.
To a considerable extent, it has to leave the professional goal-means rationality that reproduces this
schema. It means that in the content and the organization of its medical, educational and supporting
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care professional care needs to seek its starting point in a ‘paradigm of encounter’ or better yet, in
‘encounter’ as such, for each paradigm runs the risk of hardening into a doctrine. Care paradigms that
remain ﬁxated on activities that normal, healthy, integrated people should undertake for deviant, sick
or excluded people, stand in the way of truly meeting one another and living together. Encounter as
the supporting foundation opens up professional care and its organization for contributions to social
inclusion. Then professional care can apply itself to what it still does not see enough as its core task:
taking care of and nourishing beneﬁcial connections between people and their stories.
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